Why plan for quantum-safe encryption now

Moving to quantum-safe encryption, also called post-quantum cryptography, means finding every system that depends on an affected method, testing replacements, changing them in an order that doesn’t break what depends on them, and confirming each change held. The G7’s roadmap calls cryptographic transition “often a complex and time-consuming process that must be undertaken with care to be done safely.”

That’s the case for starting now. The work takes years and the dates are already on the calendar, whenever a capable quantum computer turns out to arrive.

Why it takes years

Cryptography is spread through almost everything an organization runs: websites and APIs, internal services, databases, devices, build pipelines, and connections to partners. Each place has to be found, its owner identified, its dependencies understood, and its change scheduled around everything else the team is doing.

Some changes are quick, a configuration update in one window. Others wait on a vendor release, a hardware refresh, or a partner who has to move at the same time. The slowest items set the length of the programme, which is why they need to start first.

The dates are set

A June 2026 US executive order moves high-value federal systems to quantum-safe encryption by the end of 2030, and to quantum-safe signatures by the end of 2031. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre asks organizations to complete discovery and a first plan by 2028, their highest-priority moves by 2031, and everything by 2035. The G7’s financial cyber experts suggest critical financial systems move between 2030 and 2032, and the whole sector by 2035; that roadmap is non-binding guidance.

These come from different bodies and apply to different organizations, but they point the same way. The detail on turning them into a plan is in a deadline isn’t a migration plan.

Most organizations haven’t started

In the 2026 Entrust and Ponemon Institute study, only 38% of organizations said they were actively moving to quantum-safe encryption, and limited visibility into where cryptography is used was the top barrier for the second year running. IBM’s quantum-safe readiness index averaged 25 out of 100 in 2025, up from 21 in 2023.

Read plainly, most organizations can’t yet say where they rely on cryptography. That’s the first problem to solve, and it’s one you can start on this quarter.

Where to begin

The 2023 quantum-readiness factsheet from CISA, the NSA and NIST recommends two first steps, a roadmap and a cryptographic inventory. In practice:

• Build a map of where your business relies on cryptography, with an owner for every finding. A CBOM is a useful form for it.
• Protect long-lived data first, starting with how keys are agreed for data that must stay private for years.
• Plan changes in waves your teams can absorb, with the longest lead times first.
• Confirm each change before moving on, so progress reports describe outcomes rather than activity.

If that feels like a lot, start smaller. Why the first scope should be small explains how to get one application through the whole loop first.

What a good first year looks like

A year from now, an organization that starts today could reasonably have:

• A map of where cryptography is used in its most important systems, with an owner for each finding.
• A ranked list of what to change, ordered by how long data must stay private and how long each change will take.
• Today’s quick fixes done and confirmed, because they remove real exposure and build momentum.
• A first wave of quantum-safe changes planned, starting with the longest lead times.
• A regular report to leadership that separates risk today, risk from quantum computers and the rules.

None of that depends on knowing when a quantum computer will arrive.

Questions boards are asking

• Are we exposed today, and to what?
• Which deadlines apply to us, and are we on track for them?
• What will this cost, and what does it cost to wait?
• Who owns it, and when do we see progress?